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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1970s and the 1980s many developing countries realized 
that enterprises from the industrialized world were reluctant to transfer 
funds and technology to support investment projects in countries without 
solid legal systems. Now, with a global economic downturn, the 
competition between potential host countries of investment projects has 
become tougher, and even industrialized nations must take pro-active steps 
to attract foreign investment. The enactment of investor-friendly laws and 
regulations plays an important role in this context. Problems arise, 
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however, if the marketing function dominates the legislative rationale, as 
demonstrated by the recent “enactment” of the German Corporate 
Governance Code. 
This Article first briefly explains the German corporate governance 
system in the context of global developments. This Article will then 
discuss the German Corporate Governance Code and related problems. 
Finally, this Article argues that the Code’s legislative goal is to promote 
Germany’s capital markets, while its normative impact is limited. The 
question is whether this new function of law as a marketing tool is 
justifiable. 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A. Definition 
Good corporate governance is meant to solve the principal-agent 
problem,1 which arises whenever one party (the principal) employs 
another party (the agent) to perform a service. How can the principal 
ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s own interests, and how can the 
agency costs be kept low?2 In the case of corporations, how can the 
owners (the shareholders) as principals make sure that their agents (the 
managers) only act in the owner’s best interest, i.e. for the value of the 
shares?3 In a broader sense, corporate governance stands for the 
management and the supervision of enterprises,4 thus covering a wide 
range of topics related to company law and capital markets in the context 
of success-oriented management and responsible supervision of 
 
 
 1. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 46-49 (1998); John 
Cassidy, The Greed Circle, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 66. See also HANS-BARND SCHÄFER 
& CLAUS OTT, LEHRBUCH DER ÖKONOMISCHEN ANALYSE DES ZIVILRECHTS [TEXTBOOK OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL LAW] 529 (2d ed. 1995); C. Teichmann, ECLR Corporate Governance 
in Europa [ECLR Corporate Governance in Europe], in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS-UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 645, 662 (2001). 
 2. Cassidy, supra note 1, at 66-67; But see Jensen, supra note 1, at 4 (“there are nevertheless no 
‘perfect agents’ in the real world. In other words, no one so thoroughly embodies the preferences of 
another that he or she can be that person’s perfect agent.”). 
 3. Cassidy, supra note 1, at 66-67. 
 4. Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance—Unternehmensführung, 
Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung des Aktienrechts [Report of the Government Commission 
‘Corporate Governance-Management of Enterprises-Modernization of the Stock Corporation Law’], 
DRUCKSACHE-BUNDESRAT 14/7515 Aug. 14, 2001, available at http://www.boersenzeitung.de/online/ 
redaktion/buecher/b020302.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Report of the First 
Commission]; German Corporate Governance Code (the “German Code”), http://www.corporate-
governance-code.de/eng/download/DCG_K_E.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter the German 
Code]; NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 273 (2002); DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 236 
(2002).  
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enterprises.5 However, despite its rather fashionable use in modern times, 
a detailed definition of the globally-accepted term “corporate governance” 
does not exist.6
Numerous books and articles have been written about advantages and 
disadvantages of different corporate governance models. The scope of this 
Article does not permit a discussion of these various viewpoints. However, 
it must be pointed out that there is not just one globally suitable corporate 
governance model. On the contrary, every jurisdiction must develop its 
own structure based on each country’s cultural, social, economic and, last 
but not least, legal environment.7
B. Corporate Governance in Germany 
In Germany, rules regarding the management and supervision of stock 
corporations have traditionally been set out in statutory law, in particular 
in the German Stock Corporation Act, the Commercial Code, and the Co-
Determination Act. These rules, which are mostly compulsory, are 
supplemented by the stipulations of the articles of association of German 
stock corporations, general trade practices, and German court decisions.8  
The German stock corporation system is different from the structures 
applied in common law jurisdictions. German law takes a dualistic 
approach, providing that a Management Board is solely responsible for the 
management of a stock corporation. A Supervisory Board appoints the 
 
 
 5. Core elements include investor relations and relations with stakeholders (employees, clients, 
suppliers, interest groups like labor unions). Corporate Governance in Deutschland [Corporate 
Governance in Germany] See Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V./PwC Deutsche Revision 
AG ed, (“BDI”), 12, available at http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/ 
DocID/74BFE7DF5E2F656880256C2C00C0554 (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinafter BDI]. 
 6. G. Roth & M. Büchele, Corporate Governance: Gesetz und Selbstverpflichtung [Corporate 
Governance: Law and Self-commitment], DER GESELLSCHAFTER 63 (2002); GYC Mok, Corporate 
Governance–A Practitioner’s View, 11 HONG KONG LAW. 33 (2002); Moses Chang, Corporate 
Governance–Avoid Lurking Hazards, 10 HONG KONG LAW. 76, 76-77 (2002); U.H. Schneider, 
Kapitalmarktorientierte Corporate Governance-Grundsätze [Capital Markets-oriented Corporate 
Governance Standards], DER BETRIEB 2413 (2002); UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ § 76 Rn. 15a (5th 
ed. 2002); Martin Peltzer, Corporate Governance Codices als zusätzliche Pflichtenbestimmung für den 
Aufsichtsrat [Corporate Governance Codes as additional Determination of the Obligation of the 
Supervisory Board], NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 10, 12 (2002). 
 7. With regard to this problem of the so-called “path dependency of corporate governance” 
from the German viewpoint, see Teichmann, supra note 1, at 675. See also P. Hommelhoff, Die 
OECD-Principles on Corporate Governance—ihre Chancen und Risiken aus dem Blickwinkel der 
deutschen corporate governance-Bewegung [The OECD-Principles on Corporate Governance–Their 
Chances and Risks from the Viewpoint of the Germany Corporate Governance-Movement], 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS-UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 238, 263 (2001); Schneider, supra 
note 6, at 2415. 
 8. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at side n.4; Hommelhoff, supra note 7, at 241. 
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members of the Management Board, supervises its activities, and carries 
out advisory functions.9 In contrast, common law countries use a monistic 
system in which only the Board of Directors is in charge of the 
management of a company. In addition, in Germany, shareholders’ rights 
and interests are protected by mostly mandatory statutory law.10 Common 
law, in particular American state law, is different and relies to a large 
extent on the assumption that the market will enforce compliance with 
corporate governance standards and prevent stipulations in companies’ 
articles of association that are potentially harmful for investors.11  
In Germany, the discussion regarding the legal framework of success-
oriented management of enterprises and its supervision started some 150 
years ago and has been put into practice by related stock corporation law 
reforms.12 For this reason, the global discussion about corporate 
governance was observed with some skepticism in Germany, and was 
regarded as “old wine in new bottles.”13 However, in light of the 
globalization of the world’s economies and the worldwide economic 
crisis, the picture has changed. Towards the end of the 1990s, several 
private corporate governance initiatives were launched.14 These initiatives 
lead to the creation of two general corporate governance codes based on 
foreign models.15 In addition, a number of German enterprises developed 
 
 
 9. German Code, supra note 4, at Foreword; from a German comparative perspective, see P.C. 
Leyens, Deutscher Aufsichtsrat und U.S.-Board: ein- oder zweistufiges Verwaltungssystem? [German 
Supervisory Board and U.S.-Board: One or Two-tier Administrative System?], RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT 57 (2003).  
 10. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at n.4. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. (“permanent stock corporation reform”). In particular, the Law for Small Stock 
Corporations and for the Deregulation of the Stock Corporation Law of 2.8. 1994 (BGBl. I. at 1961), 
and the Law for the Control and Transparency in the Enterprise Area of 27.4.1998 (BGBl.I at 786) 
brought major improvements to German corporate governance by improving the work of supervisory 
boards, increasing the transparency of boards, and enhancing of the control possibilities of the 
shareholder’s meetings and the role of auditors. Teichmann, supra note 1, at 673; Schneider, supra 
note 6, at 2143; see also Maβnahmenkatalog der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung der 
Unternehmensintegrität und des Anlegerschutzes [Catalogue of Measures of the Federal Government 
for the Enhancement of Corporate Integrity and the Protection of Shareholders], NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT XXVIII-XXXIII (2003). 
 13. Ulrich Seibert, Im Blickpunkt: Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex ist da [Focus: 
The German Corporate Governance Code Has Arrived], DER BETRIEBSBERATER 581 (2002); ROTH, 
supra note 6, at 64. 
 14. The initiatives were the “Grundsatzkommission Corporate Governance” and the “Berliner 
Initiativkreis Corporate Governance.” cf. Schneider, supra note 6, at 2413.  
 15. For the draft of the “Grundsatzkommission Corporate Governance,” see DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 1091 (2000). For the draft of the “Berliner Initiativkreis Corporate Governance 
[Code of Corporate Governance],” see DER BETRIEB 1573 (2000), available at http://www.gccg.de/ 
codex_eng.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).  
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their own codes of corporate governance practice.16 The idea behind all 
corporate governance codes is to establish standards for good enterprise 
management and supervision, to which enterprises purport to adhere by 
adopting so-called declarations of compliance.17 Because corporate 
governance codes do not have the quality of state law, they are regarded as 
the “instruments of self-regulation” of the business world. 
C. Developments in other Countries and on the Supra-national Level 
In North America, corporate governance issues have been a topic of 
discussion for the past 40 years.18 In particular, giant pension funds have 
adopted their own corporate governance standards in order to assess 
potential investment opportunities. It appears as if the origin of the code-
model in the corporate governance context lies here.19 In Europe, Great 
Britain was the first country to pick up the corporate governance 
discussion. These developments led to the creation of the so-called 
Combined Code.20 Compliance with the Combined Code has been a listing 
requirement at the London Stock Exchange since 2000.21 The corporate 
governance discussion soon spread from Great Britain to the European 
mainland and is mirrored on the different national levels through the 
adoption of similar corporate governance codes.22  
In line with the worldwide trend to create codes of corporate 
governance,23 on the supra-national level the European Union,24 the 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., the corporate governance codes of Deutsche Bank, at 
http://group.deutsche-bank.de/ir/pdfs/ en_corgov_112002.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2003); Douglas 
Holding, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, http://www.douglas-holding.de/de/pressemedien/publikationen_
1/archiv_cg.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003). See also Wolfgang Bernhardt, Der Deutsche Corporate 
Governance Kodex: Zuwahl (comply) or Abwahl (explain)? [The German Corporate Governance 
Code: Opt-in (comply) or Opt-out (Explain)], DER BETRIEB 1841, 1846 (2002). 
 17. ROTH, supra note 6, at 68. 
 18. BDI, supra note 5, at 15. Berle and Means formulated the basics of corporate governance in 
1932. A.E. BERLE & G.C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (William S. 
Hein ed., 1982).  
 19. ROTH, supra note 6, at 65. It must be pointed out, however, that the code-model is not 
exclusive to corporate governance. In particular, on the international law level, governments tried to 
establish codes of best practice in order to control the cross-border activities of multinational 
enterprises, see Ahmed Khalaf Masa’deh, International Rules for Investment and Investors: Light at 
the End of the Tunnel?, 11 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 157, 164-65 (2000). 
 20. See Combined Code, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 
2003) (“Combined Code”). 
 21. BDI, supra note 5, at 39. 
 22. See Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth, http://www.combinet.net/ 
Governance/FinalVer/listof.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003); European Corporate Governance 
Institute, Index of Codes, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003). 
 23. By October 2000, about seventy codes with standards of corporate governance which had 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),25 and 
the World Bank (in connection with other institutions) have formulated 
their own corporate governance standards.26 The “global code-fever” has 
in the meantime even reached the Peoples Republic of China, where the 
All China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State 
Economic and Trade Commission issued the Standards of Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies on January 7, 2002.27 Ironically, while 
the import of Anglo-American self-regulation in the form of corporate 
governance codes has obviously become very popular, the United States 
government seems to have taken a step in the opposite direction by 
responding to the Enron disaster and other corporate scandals with the 
rather strict rules of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act28 of July 30, 2002. 
 
 
been formulated on national or supra-national levels, had been counted worldwide. See BDI, supra 
note 5, at Annex 3. See also http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.htm, supra note 20. 
 24. As part of the program “Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market” (SLIM), a corporate 
governance working group was established by the European Union. The working group recently 
published its proposals, which David Bogler criticized for being “lukewarm proposals.” David Bogler, 
Germany’s Balance Sheet Police, FIN. TIMES, NOV. 8, 2002, at 8. 
 25. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/pdf/ 
M00008000/M00008299.pdf (last visited on Sept. 10, 2003). The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance are thought to provide minimum standards for the legal, institutional and regulatory 
constitutions of enterprises in developing countries. Id. Most of the industrialized nations have long 
complied with the OECD Principles. Id. 
 26. BDI, supra note 5, at 38. See also Susanne Soederberg, The Promotion of ‘Anglo-American’ 
Corporate Governance in the South: Who Benefits From the New International Standard, THIRD 
WORLD Q., 7, 11-16 (2003). 
 27. Bulletin of the All China Securities Regulatory Commission [Zhongguo zhengquan jiandu 
guanli weiyuanhui gongbao], No. 1, 6 (2002). See also Cai Shumo & Deng Yingxia, Corporate 
Governance in China—Obstacles and New Developments, 29.10 INT’L BUS. LAW. 455 (2001); I in 
MacNeil, Adaption and Convergence: The Case of Chinese Listed Companies, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD., 
289 (2002); Cindy Schipani & Juahai-Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 1 COLUM. 
BUS. REV. 1 (2002); Zhongfei Zhou & Jingwei Li, In Search of Approaches to Improving Corporate 
Governance in China’s State-owned Commercial Banks, 36 INT’L LAW. 215 (2002); Hongchuan Liu & 
Zili Ren, Halfway to Effective Shareholder Protection, CHINA L. & PRAC. 29 (2003).  
 28. See, e.g., Günter Christian Schwarz & Björn Holland, Enron, WorldCom . . . und die 
Corporate-Governance-Diskussion [Enron, WorldCom . . . and the Corporate Governance 
Discussion], ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT 1661 (2002); Hans-Georg Kamann & 
Martina Simpkins, Sarbanes Oxley Act—Anlass zu Verstärkter Internationaler Kooperation im 
Bereich der Corporate Governance? [Sarbanes Oxley Act—Reason For More International Co-
operation in the Area of Corporate Governance?], 49.2 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 
183 (2003); Hans Peter Leube, Corporate Governance the American Way?: Konsequenzen aus 
Geänderten Corporate-Governance-Bestimmungen der New York Stock Exchange für Deutsche 
Emittenten, 49.2 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 98 (2003); Scott Benner et al., The Long 
Arm of America’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, THE HONG KONG LAW. 55-59 (2002); Behn Steil, 
American Investor Protection is Protectionist, FT.COM, Jan. 15, 2003, at http://news. 
ft.com/servlet/contentserver?pagename=FT.com/storyFT/fullstory&c=storyFT&cid=1042490813895&
p=1612571727126 (last visited Sept. 10, 2003); John Palenberg et al., U.S. Governance Reforms Clash 
With German Practice, 11 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 24 (2002). 
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III. THE GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
A. History and Contents 
On May 29, 2000 the German Chancellor established the Government 
Commission on “Corporate Governance–Corporate Management–
Corporate Supervision–Modernization of the Stock Corporation Law” (the 
“First Commission”).29 In July 2001, this First Commission, under the 
leadership of the Frankfurt-based law professor Theodor Baums, presented 
a final report (the “Report of the First Commission”) to the Federal 
Minister of Justice. The report was based on questionnaires that were sent 
to more than 80 experts and institutions. Apart from a large number of 
recommendations for legislative changes, the First Commission also 
suggested that another commission be established30 in order to formulate a 
code of corporate governance for listed companies. This second 
commission (the “Second Commission”) was established in September 
2001, and on February 26, 2002 it published the German Corporate 
Governance Code (the “German Code”).31  
The German Code applies to German listed companies. It recommends, 
however, that non-listed companies observe the German Code as well.32 
The German Code is published in the Electronic Federal Gazette33 and will 
be reviewed and adjusted yearly as necessary by the Second Commission 
on the basis of national and international developments.34 The first 
adjustment already took place on November 7, 2002.  
The regulations of the German Code35 are divided into three categories: 
(1) passages that only repeat German law that is already in force,36
(2) recommendations for the organs of companies which are marked 
in the text by the use of the word “shall,” and 
 
 
 29. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at A; Schneider, supra note 6, at 2413.  
 30. Compare Bernhardt, supra note 16, at 1842. 
 31. Seibert, supra note 13, at 581. 
 32. German Code, supra note 4, at Foreward. See also Report of the First Commission, supra 
note 4, at 13. 
 33. See http://www.ebundesanzeiger.de/download/kodex2.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2003). 
 34. German Code, supra note 4, at Foreword. 
 35. The German Code is comprised of the following seven chapters: (1) Foreword; (2) 
Shareholders and General Meeting; (3) Cooperation between Management Board and Supervisory 
Board; (4) Management Board; (5) Supervisory Board; (6) Transparency; (7) Reporting and Audit of 
the Annual Financial Statements. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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 (3) “soft suggestions”37 for which the German Code uses the words 
“should” and “can.”38
The significance of each of the three categories is different. Passages of 
the German Code that repeat existing law have only declaratory, or better 
stated, informatory, functions. Further, soft “suggestions” may be 
followed or not followed without any consequence.39 In contrast, the 
“recommendations” of the German Code have been made quasi-obligatory 
by the enactment of a new Section 161 of the Stock Corporation Act.40 
Section 161 of the Stock Corporation Act41 was introduced by the 
Transparency and Disclosure Law which entered into force on July 26, 
2002. This law obliges the Management Board and Supervisory Board42 of 
listed companies to declare annually that the company complies with the 
recommendations of the German Code or the extent of non-compliance.43 
In addition, Section 161 obliges that the declaration be communicated to 
the company’s shareholders.44 This so-called “comply-or-explain 
mechanism” is regarded as the core of the German Code.  
As explained above, compliance with the Combined Code is a listing 
 
 
 37. Seibert, supra note 13, at 583. 
 38. German Code, supra note 4, at Foreword.  
 39. Id. 
 40. O. Erhardt & E. Nowak, Die Durchsetzung von Corporate Governance-Regeln [The 
Enforcement of Corporate Governance Rules], DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 336 (2002). 
 41. Section 161 of the Stock Corporation Act states: 
Management board and supervisory board of a listed company declare annually that the 
standards of best practice of the Code Commission regarding management and supervision of 
enterprises as published in the Electronic Federal Gazette are being followed and which 
standards have not been applied. The declaration is to be made available permanently for 
shareholders. 
 42. Martin Peltzer, Handlungsbedarf in Sachen Corporate Governance [Action Required in the 
Matter of Corporate Governance] NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 593, 594 (2002). 
Compare, however, Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 6.3 of the German Code which address “die 
Gesellschaft” (the company) and not the management board or the supervisory board. German Code, 
supra note 4, §§ 2.3.2-3, 6.3. 
 43. There is, however, no obligation to provide an explanation in the declaration of compliance 
for any non-compliance with the German Code. C.H. Seibt, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 
und Entsprechens—Erklärung (§ 161 AktG-E) [German Corporate Governance Code and Declaration 
of Compliance (§ 161 Stock Corporation Act—Draft], DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 249, 252 (2002); 
Peltzer, supra note 42, at 594. Deviations from the German Code must be explained, however, in the 
Companies Annual Report according to Section 3.10 of the German Code. German Code, supra 4, 
§ 3.10. 
 44. Section 161 of the Stock Corporation Act. Many companies have, for example, publicized 
their declaration of compliance on the company website. Pursuant to the newly adjusted § 325 
paragraph 1 of the German Commercial Code, the declaration of compliance must also be submitted to 
the Commercial Registry, see also the publication requirements in connection with the balance sheet 
pursuant to § 285 Nr. 16 § 314 I Nr. 8 of the German Commercial Code. 
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requirement in Great Britain.45 However, in Germany, there are no such 
direct consequences for listed companies that choose not to follow the 
recommendations of the German Code.46 It is, however, expected that the 
German Code will gain indirect legal significance through its ability to 
interpret other statutory rules. The stipulations of the German Code may 
be used to determine whether directors or members of the Supervisory 
Board of listed companies have violated any of their duties.47
Many legal writers had hoped that the German Code will help to unify 
the regulations of the various previously existing private codes.48 
However, neither Section 161 of the Stock Corporation Act nor the 
German Code itself prevent German companies from recognizing and 
declaring their compliance with other private or foreign corporate 
governance codes.49  
The vast majority of German legal writers and practitioners have 
welcomed the publication of the German Code and its implementation 
through Section 161 of the Stock Corporation Act.50 However, the German 
Code also provokes very important questions that shall be discussed in the 
following sections.  
B. Compatibility of the Code-Model with the German System 
1. Management Culture 
In the past, Germany has twice attempted to use code-models for 
regulatory purposes in the area of stock corporations.51 Both attempts have 
 
 
 45. Combined Code, supra note 20, at Preamble. 
 46. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at 9; Seibt, supra note 43, at 250; Peter Ulmer, 
Aktienrecht im Wandel [The Changing Stock Corporation Law], 202 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHS 
PRAXIS 143,170 (2002). 
 47. Ulmer, supra note 46, at 170; Seibt, supra note 43, at 250. 
 48. Seibert, supra note 13, at 581; Teichmann, supra note 1, at 676; Hommelhoff, supra note 7, 
at 242.  
 49. Sometimes that may even be necessary for an intended listing at the London Stock Exchange. 
See Combined Code, supra 20, at pmbl. 
 50. Seibert, supra note 13, at 583. Compare Bernhardt, supra note 16, at 1841; Leyens, supra 
note 9, at 102-05. 
 51. Section 10.95 of the Takeover Code of October 1, 1995 has been replaced by the Securities 
Acquisition and Takeover Act, which entered into force on January 1, 2002. See THOMAS 
STOHLMEIER, GERMAN PUBLIC TAKEOVER LAW (2002). The Securities Trading Act of 1994 replaced 
the Recommendations Regarding Insider Problems, to which the German Ministry of Economics 
consented on July 1, 1976 and which had last been revised in May 1988. Both the Takeover Code and 
the Recommendations Regarding Insider Problems were sets of rules which had to be positively 
adopted by listed companies (so-called “opt in-model”). On the contrary, Section 161 of the Stock 
Corporation Act now applies the “opt out-model.” See Peter Ulmer, Der Deutsche Corporate 
Governance Kodex–Ein Neues Regulierungsinstrument für Börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaften [The 
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failed.52 However, this kind of practical experience should not have been 
the only reason to be careful with the introduction of a code-model in 
Germany.  
As explained above, the idea to use a code-model in order to achieve 
the desired self-regulation of the business world has its origins in the 
Anglo-American jurisdictions.53 Adopting legal structures from abroad is, 
however, dangerous because of potential compatibility risks.54 It is 
commonly acknowledged in the field of management-related theory and 
practice that the way managers approach their work greatly depends upon 
their cultural background. Nationality, or the home culture of a manager, 
has three times more influence on shaping managerial assumptions than 
any of the respective managers’ other characteristics, such as age, sex, or 
position within the structure of the company.55 Empirical studies also 
show that management approaches can be very different if the respective 
managers do not have identical cultural backgrounds.56 The same 
proposition is true of course with regard to what extent managers really do 
want to regulate themselves or to what extent they have the ability to do 
so.57 Therefore, even if the code-model had been used successfully in other 
jurisdictions, it is not necessarily guaranteed that this will be the case as 
well in Germany. In addition, corporate tragedies in the Anglo-American 
world in recent years, such as the Enron debacle, indicate that too much 
faith in managerial ability and willingness of self-regulation can be 
potentially fatal. Also, the failure of stock option programs as a solution 
 
 
German Corporate Governance Code–A New Regulatory Instrument for Listed Stock Corporations?] 
166 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 150, 159 (2002).  
 52. Erhardt, supra note 40, at 343 (“not necessarily to be regarded as encouraging examples”).  
 53. ROTH, supra note 6, at 64 (“methodologically new way”); Martin Wolf, Corporate 
Governance: Impact of Anglo-Saxon Self-Regulation, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 59 (2002); 
Erhardt, supra note 40, at 342 (“strongly oriented towards the more flexible features of the federal 
stock corporation law of the US-American states”). For general aspects, see, e.g., Soederberg, supra 
note 26, at 20.  
 54. Schneider, supra note 6, at 2415; Teichmann, supra note 1, at 651; Lutz-Christian Wolff & 
Bing Ling, The Risk of Mixed Laws: The Example of Indirect Agency Under Chinese Contract Law, 15 
COL. J. ASIAN L. 173, 174-75 (2002). 
 55. André Laurent, The Cross-Cultural Puzzle of Global Human Resource Management, in 
GLOBALIZING MANAGEMENT – CREATING AND LEADING THE COMPETITIVE ORGANIZIATION 174, 176 
(Valdimir Pucik et al. eds., 1992).  
 56. MARK MENDENHALL ET AL., GLOBAL MANAGEMENT 286 (1995); RICHARD MEAD, 
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: CROSS-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 167-231 (1995); P.R. HARRIS & RT 
MORAN, MANAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (4th ed. 1996); H.N. SEELYE & A SEELYE-JAMES, 
CULTURE CLASH 78 (1996); E. MARK, BREAKING THROUGH CULTURE SHOCK 77 (1999). 
 57. The “path dependency” of corporate governance structures had already been mentioned 
above in the text prior to note 6. See also Benny S. Tabalujan, Why Indonesian Corporate Governance 
Failed–Conjectures Concerning Legal Culture, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 142, 162-71 (2002). 
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for the principal-agent problem58 shows that corporate governance should 
not always be left to those whose failure has made it necessary in the first 
place to take action.59  
The German decision to use the code-model is based on the assumption 
that related managers, or the members of the Management Board and the 
members of the Supervisory Board will comply with the recommendations 
of the German Code, and that true declarations of compliance will be 
issued.60 This assumption is in turn based on the assumption that capital 
markets will sanction any non-compliance with the recommendations of 
the German Code.61 Because the German Code depends on the correctness 
of these assumptions, an accurate forecast of its potential for success 
would require empirical studies regarding the manner that German 
managers react to the challenges of self-regulation. Examples of the 
relevant questions that such studies would have to answer are whether 
managers of German listed companies actually follow the 
recommendations of a code of best corporate governance practice at all,62 
whether they publish true declarations of compliance, and whether they 
will change the declaration in the event that the factual situation changes.63 
Publicly-available materials do not support the conclusion that the German 
Code is based any such kind of specific empirical investigations. 
2. Constitutional Law 
The code-model’s compatibility with German business culture is not 
the only critical issue. Problems also arise with respect to the viewpoint of 
German constitutional law. Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation 
Act refers to future standards of the German Code as established and 
amended by the Second Commission.64 It has been claimed that this 
“dynamic reference” is incompatible with the principle of democracy set 
 
 
 58. Combined Code, supra note 20, § B.2.1. 
 59. Hommelhoff, supra note 7, at 242 (“voluntary action—even under pressure of market 
forces—is not as common in this country that lawmakers could refrain from taking action”); cf. 
Bernhardt, supra note 16, at 1845. 
 60. Peltzer, supra note 42, at 594; Seibt, supra note 43, at 250. 
 61. ROTH, supra note 6, at 66; Erhardt, supra note 40, at 342. But see Peltzer, supra note 42, at 
594. 
 62. A group of companies listed at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (NEMAX 50-Index) issued a 
joint corporate governance declaration in Oct. 2002 that goes beyond the recommendations of the 
German Code. Declaration on Corporate Governance, at http://www.ixos.com/ftb/int/home-
en/investors/governance.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2003). 
 63. Erhardt, supra note 40, at 342; Peltzer, supra note 423, at 595. 
 64. German Code, supra note 4, Foreword. 
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forth in Article 20 of the German Basic Law.65 The basis of these 
constitutional concerns is that the German Code was originally drafted 
and, if necessary, will be adjusted annually by the Second Commission. 
The Second Commission, however, is not elected by way of a democratic 
process, rather it is appointed by the Minister of Justice.66 The First 
Commission was obviously aware of the constitutional problems, and as a 
result, obtained an expert’s legal opinion on this issue. Based on the report 
of the First Commission, it appears that the expert concluded that the 
code-model does not violate the German Basic Law.67 The relevant 
passage of the Report of the First Commission reads as follows: “the 
obligation to declare and explain only establishes a communication 
between the listed company and the capital market, which finds its 
sufficient basis in the respective stipulation of the Stock Corporation 
Act.”68
It is doubtful, however, that the above-mentioned constitutional 
problems can be eliminated by simply declaring that the legal obligation 
established by Section 161 of the Stock Corporation Act is a 
communication tool. It remains to be seen whether German constitutional 
organs will also adopt this viewpoint. 
3. German Stock Corporation Law System 
As mentioned above, German stock corporation law, unlike corporate 
law systems in the Common Law-world, is to a large extent governed by 
 
 
 65. Article 20 of the German Basic Law reads as follows: 
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. 
(2) All state authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by the people by means 
of elections and voting and by specific legislative, executive and judicial organs.  
(3) Legislation shall be subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary 
shall abe bound by law and justice. 
(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish that constitutional 
order, should no other remedy be possible. 
Grundgeszte [GG][Constitution] art. 20. 
 66. Wolf, supra note 53, at 59–60; Ulmer, supra note 51, at 162; Seibt, supra note 43, at 249; 
Schneider, supra note 6, at 2417; Martin Lutter, Vergleichende Corporate Governance–Die deutsche 
Sicht [Comparative Corporate Governance–The German Viewpoint], ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 224, 228 (2001); Seibert, supra note 13, at 581. See 
generally Paul Kirchhoff, Gesetzgebung und Private Regelsetzung als Geltungsgrund für 
Rechnungslegungspflichten? [Legislating and Private Rulemaking as Reason for the Effectiveness of 
Accounting Obligations?], ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 681, 685-
86 (2000) (discussing general aspects of constitutional law). 
 67. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at 17. 
 68. Id. 
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mandatory statutory law.69 Therefore, the introduction of a model of 
corporate self-regulation should mean that the traditionally strict statutory 
structures are abandoned and more regulatory power is granted to the 
market. With respect to whether this approach makes sense at all or 
whether it is even possible in Germany, the fifth edition of Hüffer’s 
standard commentary on  
the German Stock Corporation Act, which was published shortly prior to 
the German Code, provides the following self-explanatory comment: 
From a legal point of view, especially from a stock corporation law 
point of view there is no need for a code with corporate governance 
rules. . . . The Continental-European legal tradition, in particular the 
density of rules within the German area does not leave any room for 
a useful code.70
4. Legal Nature of the German Code 
Another interesting issue is how the German Code fits into the German 
system of legal sources. According to the Report of the Second 
Commission, the German Code cannot be regarded as law because it is not 
enforceable per se.71 Some legal writers have suggested that the German 
Code is located on a “regulatory mid-level” between formal laws and the 
stipulations of the respective companies’ articles of association.72 This 
idea, however, does not appear to be correct because both laws and the 
stipulations contained in the articles of association are normally legally 
binding, while the German Code obtains, at most, only indirect legal 
significance through the declaration of compliance by the respective 
management bodies.73 Consequently, it must, therefore, be concluded that 
the German Code does not fit into the traditional German system of legal 
sources.74  
 
 
 69. BDI, supra note 5, § 2.2. 
 70. Hüffer, supra note 6, at 76; see Lutter, supra note 66, at 227. 
 71. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at 17; Ulmer, supra note 46, at 167.  
 72. Hommelhoff, supra note 7, at 244; Lutter, supra note 66, at 237. 
 73. Ulmer, supra note 46, at 169; Peltzer, supra note 42, at 10. 
 74. Ulmer, supra note 46, at 168. 
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C. Legislative Rationale 
1. Information of Investors 
It has been established above that major problems exist with regard to 
the compatibility of the German Code with the German system. This 
provokes the question of why the code-model has nevertheless been 
adopted. In other words, what was the legislative rationale behind the 
introduction of the German Code? The German Code itself expressly 
states only one goal:  
The Code aims at making the German Corporate Governance 
system transparent and understandable. Its purpose is to promote the 
trust of international and national investors, customers, employees 
and the general public in the management and supervision of listed 
German stock corporations.75  
The Report of the First Commission is even more outspoken when it 
explains that the introduction of the German Code is necessary because “in 
particular Anglo-American, but also increasingly domestic institutional 
investors and shareholder groups do have knowledge of such kind of 
regulatory framework and principles and request their observation.”76
In order to understand the focus on institutional investors,77 in 
particular financial institutions, pension funds, and insurance companies, 
one must remember that the nature of shareholders has changed very much 
in Germany and elsewhere over the last two decades. The volume of 
investments of institutional investors, particularly from the United 
Kingdom and North America, has seen explosive growth rates.78 For 
example, British Vodafone AirTouch made a hostile takeover-bid for 
German Mannesmann in November 1999. When the merger was finally 
concluded in February 2000, the $183 billion deal was the largest 
 
 
 75. German Code, supra note 4, at Foreword. Compare Seibt, supra note 43, at 250 with 
Bernhardt, supra note 16, at 1846. See generally ROTH, supra note 6, at 66. 
 76. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at side n.6. For the dominance of Anglo-
American investors, see ROTH, supra note 6, at 64; Teichmann, supra note 1, at 652; Soederberg, 
supra note 26, at 21. Soederaberg writes: “Increasingly shareholder activism in general and the 
pressure from institutional investors in particular play an important role in ‘forcing those demanding 
capital to comply with international standards regarding disclosure and governance.’” Id. Cf. Marcos 
Lutter, Neue Maβnahmen zum Anlegerschutz [New Measures for the Protection of Shareholders], 
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT III, 1209-72 (2003). 
 77. ROTH, supra note 6, at 66 (“pension funds corporatism”); Teichmann, supra note 1, at 652. 
 78. Id. at 652. 
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corporate merger ever.79 At the time of the takeover-bid, about forty 
percent of Mannesmann’s shares were held by Anglo-American 
institutional investors. The total percentage of institutional investors was 
as high as seventy-eight percent.80 In order to create interest for 
Germany’s capital markets, it is of course useful to explain the German 
corporate governance system,81 which greatly differs from the Anglo-
American model82 to this tremendously important group of institutional 
investors. Furthermore, it is logical to support related marketing activities 
by  
making use of the code-model, a tool with which Anglo-American 
investors are familiar.  
2. Improvement of German Corporate Governance 
Not only the title of the German Code suggests that it has the same 
ultimate goal as corporate governance codes in other countries: to improve 
the corporate governance system and to contribute to the more efficient 
management and supervision of German listed companies.83 While the 
stipulations of the German Code itself fail to address the issue explicitly, 
many legal writers have made this point as well.84 Attempting to improve 
corporate governance structures, however, only makes sense if related 
action in the form of a code is necessary at all.85 The following three 
quotations show that prior to the enactment of the German Code, this was 
not at all the common viewpoint. First, in the year 2000, the German 
Industrial Council86 and PricewaterhouseCoopers, in a joint study, took the 
following position: “To date the requirements for a functioning corporate 
 
 
 79. Vodafone-Mannesmann Merger, at http://telecomvisions.com/current/man.php (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2003). 
 80. Schneider, supra note 6, at 2414; Soederberg, supra note 26, at 21. 
 81. Soederberg, supra note 26, at 20-21. Soederberg writes: “The implicit use of the Anglo-
American definition of corporate governance in the creation of an ‘international standard’ is closely 
tied to powerful institutional investors . . .” Id. 
 According to an often-quoted McKinsey study of 1999–2000, German investors are willing to pay 
a twenty percent higher share price for good corporate governance. Ulmer, supra note 51, at 169 n.69. 
 82. See supra Part II. B and accompanying notes. 
 83. Ulmer, supra note 46, at 167 (noting “indirect pressure”). 
 84. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, side number 7; Ulmer, supra note 46, at 167 
(double function of informing and regulating); Combined Code, supra note 20, at 177; Seibert, supra 
note 13, at 581; Erhardt, supra note 40, at 336. 
 85. Schneider, supra note 6, at 2413. The scope of this Article does not permit discussion of the 
different standpoints regarding the extent that legislative action can positively impact corporate 
governance systems or whether legislative action can rely on the mechanisms of the market. 
 86. BDI, supra note 5, at 11. 
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governance are being fulfilled in Germany.”87
Even the Report of the First Commission, which suggested the creation 
of the German Code,88 concluded that Germany already had a well-
functioning corporate governance system:89
When comparing these regulatory frameworks (i.e. foreign 
corporate government standards–added by the author) and in 
particular the recommendations of the OECD, with those standards 
for the management and the supervision of enterprises applied to 
German stock corporations it must be concluded that the German 
stock corporation law currently in force corresponds to a large 
extent with the recommendations contained in those regulatory 
codes and regulatory frameworks.90
Further, the German Code can only be regarded as a tool to improve 
corporate governance structures if it does not recommend improvements 
that were already in place. Empirical studies could demonstrate to what 
extent German listed companies had already adopted measures 
recommended by the German Code prior to its implementation. However, 
some rather amazing statements have been made. Among others, the 
German attorney Dr. Peltzer, a legal expert for the First Commission, 
wrote the following: “Complying with most of the recommendations of 
the Code should not cause any problems for a properly managed company 
since in any event things are done this way. Only in exceptional cases the 
necessity for changes will arise. . . .91  
Even more outspoken was Professor Seibert, the individual within the 
Federal Ministry of Justice responsible92 for the enactment of Section 161 
of the German Stock Corporation Act and thus the implementation of the 
German Code. Seibert wrote: 
The organs could even declare that they do not follow the Code at 
all. Apart from the fact that this would not leave a good impression, 
this seems to be unrealistic, since the recommendations are mostly 
in line with practical reasonableness and acknowledged business 
rules of good management. A company that fails to apply all this 
 
 
 87. Id. at 41. 
 88. See supra Part III.A and accompanying notes. 
 89. See also Hüffer, supra note 6, at 76; Lutter, supra note 63, at 225. 
 90. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at side n.6. Compare Hüffer, supra note 6, at 
76. 
 91. Peltzer, supra note 52, at 593. 
 92. Ulmer, supra note 51, at 159. 
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would according to my opinion become insolvent within a short 
period of time.93
If these statements were correct, why then was it necessary to 
formulate the German Code and to bother German stock corporations with 
the burden of a declaration of compliance? Further, what could have 
justified taking the risk connected with the import of the code-model into 
the German system, a model which had already failed twice?94  
Indeed, a closer look at the German Code reveals that the practical 
impact of the recommendations is of minor significance either because 
they simply confirm already existing corporate practice95 or because the 
wording is vague and does not require sincere commitment.96 Contrary to 
the above-quoted statements, however, the German Code also 
recommends “real” improvements97 that go beyond what is required by 
statutory law or common practice. For example, regarding the purchase 
and sale of shares in the company by Management and Supervisory Board 
Members, the disclosure duties were tightened.98 Management Boards’ 
Terms of Reference now must specify the allocation of areas of 
responsibility and cooperation within the Management Board.99 “Re-
pricing” of variable components of the Management Board Members’ 
salaries is excluded.100 The composition of each Management Board 
Member’s salary and any additional income arising out of separate 
contractual arrangements shall be reported in the Consolidated Financial 
Statements Notes.101 The opportunity to circumvent limitations to extend 
the Management Board members’ terms of office by stepping down prior 
to the end of the term only to be reappointed immediately thereafter was 
 
 
 93. Seibert, supra note 12, at 583. 
 94. See supra Part III.B.1 and accompanying notes. 
 95. Cf. Peltzer, supra note 42, at 594-95. This is supposedly true for the following sections of the 
German Code, supra note 4: §§ 2.3.1, 3.4 ¶ 3, 4.2.1 sentence 1, 4.2.3. sentence 1, 5.1.2 sentence 6, 
5.1.3; 5.2 ¶ 1 sentence 1, 5.3.1; 5.4.5. ¶ 1 sentence 2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.7, 6.8 (as far as publication of 
relevant data on company’s internet sites are concerned), 7.1.1 sentence 2 (as far as related companies 
follow IAS).  
 96. See, e.g., German Code, supra note 4, §§ 2.3.3; 3.8; 3.10; 4.2.3 sentence; 5.1.2 ¶ 1, sentence 
1; 5.1.2, ¶ 2, sentence 2; 5.1.2 ¶ 2 sentence 3; 5.1.2 ¶ 3 sentence 1, 5.3.1; 5.4.1; 5.5.3 sentence 2-3; 
5.5.6, 6.8, 7.1.3. 
 97. But see Peltzer, supra note 42, at 594-95 and passim (de facto superfluous 
recommendations). 
 98. German Code, supra note 4, § 6.6. 
 99. Id. § 4.2.1 sentence 2. Terms of Reference of the Management Board are required under the 
German Stock Corporation Act, § 111, ¶ 4 sentence 2. 
 100. German Code, supra note 4, § 4.2.3 sentence 5. 
 101. Id. §§ 4.2.4, 5.4.5. 
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abolished.102 Both Management and Supervisory Board Members must 
disclose conflicts of interest.103 Management Board members may only 
take outside jobs with the approval of the Supervisory Board.104 The 
number of concurrent Supervisory Board memberships is limited to 
five.105 Promotions of the Management Board Members to the Supervisory 
Board are limited.106 Supervisory Boards shall establish independent Audit 
Committees.107 Finally, the German Code recommends improvements 
regarding the reporting and auditing of Annual Financial Statements.108  
All of these recommendations, however, do not require major changes 
to existing German corporate practice. The recommendations are far less 
than what could have been delegated to the corporate level and what is 
necessary to establish a serious system of self-regulation.109  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. (Code-) Form Follows (Marketing-) Function 
As described above, Germany realized that foreign institutional 
investors expect a code of corporate governance to be in place. The code-
model, however, does not fit into the German system because a 
comprehensive statutory framework of mostly mandatory corporate 
governance rules was already in place. Therefore, scholars expressed a 
widespread belief that no real need existed to adopt a code-model in order 
to improve corporate governance in Germany. The German Corporate 
Governance Code now combines these seemingly contradictory positions: 
it leaves the already existing corporate governance structures basically 
untouched, while recommending changes without major impact. 
The Report of the Government Commission, entitled “Corporate 
Governance-Corporate Management-Corporate Supervision-Modernization 
of the Stock Corporation Law,” is the base upon which the German Code 
was drafted. The report claims that three reasons exist for the 
implementation of rules regarding the management and supervision of 
 
 
 102. Id. § 5.1.2 sentence 5. Currently, this possibility is available under Stock Corporation Act 
§ 84 ¶ 1 sentence 3 (2000). 
 103. German Code, supra note 4, § 4.3.4, 5.5.2-3. 
 104. Id. § 4.3.5. 
 105. Id. § 5.4.3. But see § 100 2 Nr. 1 German Stock Corporation Act (allowing ten 
memberships). 
 106. German Code, supra note 4, § 5.4.2. 
 107. Id. § 5.3.2. 
 108. Id. §§ 7.1.1-5, 7.2.1, 7.2.3, 2.3.2-3. 
 109. Bernhardt, supra note 16, at 1842. 
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enterprises.110 The first reason is to save transaction costs by enacting non-
compulsory laws, which allow parties to avoid further negotiations 
regarding specific issues. Secondly, mandatory rules may be implemented 
in order to react to failures of the market.111 Thirdly, legal rules can aim at 
autonomous political goals.112 It is difficult to see how the German Code 
together with Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act can serve 
any of these purposes. On the contrary, it is doubtful that the benefits 
derived from the limited regulatory impact of the German Code can 
outweigh the transaction costs connected with the statutory burden 
imposed on German listed companies by Section 161 Stock Corporation 
Act to declare their compliance or non-compliance with the German Code. 
Further, despite the fact that the German Code gives a different 
impression, in Germany standards of good corporate governance are still 
guaranteed through mandatory statutory rules and not through self-
regulation of the German business world.  
The introduction of the German Code, therefore, appears to be mainly a 
marketing tool to improve the attractiveness of Germany’s capital markets 
to foreign institutional investors. And indeed, this tool seems to be a 
perfect method, as evidenced by the following commentary published on 
November 8, 2002 by the Financial Times:  
In Europe’s battle to restore investor confidence through improved 
corporate governance rules, the best hope may lie with the 
Germans. . . . As of August, it is one of the few European countries 
alongside the UK, to have in place a proper corporate governance 
code. . . . Europe’s largest economy is at least in this respect 
fulfilling its proper leadership role.113
B. Law for Marketing Purposes? 
Law114 can be regarded as a “normative order setting out what ought to 
be done.”115 Thus law is a set of rules and principles “intended to prescribe 
 
 
 110. Report of the First Commission, supra note 4, at side n.1.  
 111. This could protect minority shareholders and creditors without sufficient bargaining power 
against disadvantages arising out of the limited liability-principle. 
 112. An example would be the implementation of mandatory co-determination rights for 
employees on Supervisory Boards of enterprises with more than 500 employees.  
 113. Bogler, supra note 24, at 8. 
 114. This is not the place to discuss the historical dimension of the meaning of law, its 
philosophical meaning and intersection with politics, religion, or ethics. See STEPHEN C. HICKS, 
MODERN LEGAL THEORY: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 3 (1998). 
 115. John Bell, Statutes, Text and Operative Enactments, in SEMIOTICS AND LEGISLATION: 
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and direct human behavior”116 in order to eventually balance conflicting 
interests of different parties.117 Law can prescribe human behavior directly 
by setting positive rules, or indirectly affect human behavior by simply 
making statements,118 thus “signaling appropriate behavior and . . . 
inculcating the expectation of social opprobrium and, hence, shame in 
those who deviate from the announced norm.”119  
Due to its official character, law carries the impression of 
authenticity120 and therefore appears to be a perfect tool to promote legal 
systems. Law enacted only for marketing purposes will neither directly nor 
indirectly establish rules. In other words, it has no regulatory function. 
Consequently, the creation of law for marketing purposes means nothing 
more than a perversion of the genuine role of law and an abuse of power 
vested in legislative bodies. Lawmakers should carefully consider if they 
want their work to carry this label. 
 
 
JURISPRUDENTIAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 71, 79 (1999). 
 116. ROGER E. MEINERSER ET AL., THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 7 (8th ed. 2003).  
 117. ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 162-64 (Colier, 1939). 
See SURYA P. SINHA, JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (West 1993); Edwin W. Patterson, 
Pound’s Theory of Social Interests, INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 558-73 
(Paul Sayre ed., 1947). 
 118. This idea is being promoted by the so-called expressive theories of law. See generally Cass 
R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV., 2021 (1996); Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV., 1503 (2000). But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Sceptical Overview, 148 
U. PA. L. REV., 1363 (2002). 
 119. Sunstein, supra note 118, at 2032. 
 120. Id. at 2031 (“law will have moral weight”).  
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